Iran→Israel salvos on real 3-D terrain. Discrete-event engagement engine: battery fire cycles, weapon flyout, shoot-look-shoot, sensor line-of-sight, footprints, decoy discrimination, in-flight failures. Educational model; figures are open-source estimates.
Historical attack inventory
Strike package count / unit $ / fail%
fail% = in-flight reliability failure (boost/midcourse), per Pentagon assessments that many Iranian BMs "failed to launch or fell short". Khorramshahr-4: bus splits into 1 RV + 4 decoys at 62% of flight. Decoy airframe: soaks interceptors, no warhead.
Doctrine
Defender — Israeli doctrine
Attacker — Iranian doctrine
Israeli WTA mirrors stated Iron Dome practice (only threats predicted to hit defended assets are engaged) and magazine husbandry late in the June 2025 war. Iranian doctrine mirrors True Promise tactics: tight TOT salvos to beat battery fire cycles, aimpoint massing (Nevatim, Oct 2024), deception-led waves.
Defense vs. ballistic missiles
Defense vs. cruise missiles
Defense vs. drones / UAVs
Order of battle — real battery counts
10 Iron Dome, 2 David's Sling, 3 Arrow 2, ~2 Arrow 3, 2 US THAAD batteries, 2 Aegis DDGs. Battery fire cycle / missile flyout / defended footprint are modeled per system (e.g. Iron Dome ~6 s cycle, 15 km footprint; Arrow 3 ~25 s, national; THAAD ~15 s, 200 km). Saturation now emerges from arithmetic: too many simultaneous arrivals → batteries can't cycle fast enough.
Sensors & detection
Layers only fire while their fire-control sensors see the threat (Arrow←Green Pine, THAAD←TPY-2, SM←SPY-1/remote, ID/DS←local MMR, CAP←AEW). Discrimination vs decoys is per sensor band: X-band TPY-2 85%, Green Pine 80%, SPY-1 60%, MMR 45–55% (+15% with multi-sensor fusion, which also adds +5% Pk). Detection ranges scale with RCS (drones/cruise see ~40% range cut). Threats fly grey until detected.
Leaker damage (optional)
Monte-Carlo batch mode
Re-fights the salvo N times; statistical analysis appears in the Summary tab.